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Abstract
In many countries, the government pays almost identical nominal wages to
workers living in regions with notable economic disparities. By developing a two-
region general equilibrium model with endogenous migration and search frictions
in the labour market, I study the differences in terms of unemployment, real
wages, and welfare between a regional wage bargaining process and a national
one in the public sector. Adopting the latter makes residents in the poorer region
better off and residents of the richer region worse off. Private sector employment
decreases in the poorer region and it increases in the richer one. Under some
conditions, the unemployment rate in the poorer region soars. Simulation results
also show that a regional bargaining scheme may increase inequality.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, public sector wages are very similar in nominal terms for employees
of regions with different private sector productivities and costs of living. The spa-
tial distribution of public sector earnings is very compressed in the five largest EU
economies (Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Spain) (see Elliot et al., 2007)1. Al-
beit in a weaker form, even the US federal government regional pays are substantially
unaffected by local market conditions, while different is the case for state and local
public employees (Katz and Krueger, 1991). Among the several explanations for the
greater compression of public sector wage structures compared to private sector ones,
the highly centralized structure of the public pay systems is one of the most relevant
(Elliot et al., 2007)2.
In times in which many governments face the twofold challenge of improving the
efficiency of the public sector and restraining spending, the poor responsiveness of civil
servants to local labor market conditions has become an important issue to deal with
for economists and policy makers3. This paper enters the debate by contrasting a
centralized public sector pay system with a regional one and looking at the differences
in terms of welfare, employment, and real earnings.
In both scenarios, public sector employment and wages are determined through
1In Italy, Spain, and Germany this is accompanied by a pronounced income disparity between
regions (see, respectively, Dell’Arringa et al., 2007, Garcia-Perez and Jimeno, 2007, and Heitmueller
and Mavromaras, 2007). For France, see Meurs and Edon (2007). Some of these papers look at real
wage spatial distributions but, since they use a national price index, their results also apply to nominal
pay variations.
2The differences between private and public wage structures may be the result of worker self-
selection. However, recent research shows that the wage compression associated with public sector
pay scales has a large causal component (Melly and Puhani, 2013). The higher degree of unionization
in public sector also plays a role. On the role of unions in compressing wage inequality see Kahn
(2000) and Lemieux (1998).
3See the discussion in the next section.
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efficient bargaining between a public authority that aims to maximize revenues net
of production costs and a union. The two frameworks differ in that under the na-
tional bargaining both public sector vacancies in each region and the common wage
are bargained over by the central government and a union whose members are all the
civil servants in the country, whereas in the regional bargaining process the actors are
the local government and a union that only cares about the utility of public sector
employees of the region.
These two different public sector wage settings are nested into a two-region general
equilibrium model in which private tradable and public nontradable goods are produced
and the labor market exhibits search and matching frictions. Migration between regions
is endogenous and unemployed workers are free to apply either for a private sector
job or for a public sector one. To account for the differences between the US and
the European labor markets, I consider both the case of individual bargaining and
the case of decentralized collective negotiation in the private sector. The model is
analytically tractable in steady-state. The conclusions on wage, employment, and
welfare are obtained via comparative statics and they do not depend on the type of
private sector wage system considered.
The first result of the paper is maybe not surprising. A centralized public sector
pay system is a redistributive tool that shifts resources from the richer regions to the
poorer ones. What is perhaps less expected is the extent of such a redistribution, as
it does not involve only civil servants but all workers. Under centralized bargaining,
real wages in both sectors in the richer region decrease, whereas real wages in both
sectors in the poorer region go up. The welfare results are along the same line, with
residents in the richer region that, regardless of their employment status (i.e if they are
employed or unemployed, civil servants or private sectors worker), are worse off under
national bargaining, whereas residents in the poorer region are better off.
The rationale behind these results is the following. Under a national negotiation,
the public sector union must account for the marginal productivities and fall-back
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positions of workers of all regions. So, it ends up accepting a nominal wage that is
lower (resp. higher) than the one that would accrue to employees in the richer (resp.
poorer) region under a decentralized bargaining scheme. This has an impact on labor
supply. In comparison with a regional bargaining system, public sector jobs become
more enticing for workers in the poorer region while more residents of richer region will
apply for private jobs. In turn, the difficulties in filling public sector vacancies in the
richer region raises the production cost of the public nontradable good and, in turn,
the cost of living. Therefore, in the richer region real wages and welfare are lower under
a centralized pay system than with a regional bargaining scheme. On the contrary, in
the poorer regions public authorities find it easier to fill a vacancy, so the same chain
of events occurs with an opposite sign.
Comparative statics offers other insights. First, the redistributive effects of central-
ized bargaining decrease migration towards the richer region. Second, a national pay
system lowers private sector employment rate in the poorer region while raising it in the
richer one. Third, under a centralized wage-setting the unemployment rate can rise in
the poorer region. This is because the larger number of applications for a civil service
job in the poorer region stemming from centralized bargaining tends to “overload” the
public sector labor market. In some circumstances (for instance in periods when many
jobs are destroyed, lengthening the unemployment lines) such congestion effects are so
strong that the unemployment rate soars in the poorer region.
Further results are obtained by calibrating and simulating on the basis of Italian
data. Italy is an interesting case study, for it exhibits huge economic disparities between
the North-Center regions and the South ones, the former being 50 % richer in terms
of average disposable income per capita (ISTAT, 2013). Moreover, no statistically
significant difference emerges in nominal public wages paid across regions (Alesina
et al., 2001; Dell’Arringa et al., 2007). Numerical exercises show that a centralized
negotiation in the public sector leads to a higher unemployment rate and a lower
output in the country compared to a regional bargaining scenario. On the other hand,
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a national bargaining, by decreasing real pays in the richer parts of the country and
increasing them in the poorer ones, tends to reduce inequality: both the Gini index
and the wage variance go down.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the topic.
Section 3 and 4 present the basic model. Section 5 contrasts the regional public sector
model with the national one. Sections 6 extends the results of the baseline model to
the case of collective bargaining in the private sector. Section 7 explains the calibration
procedure. Section 8 shows the numerical exercises. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Recent papers have warned about the negative consequences of regulated pays across
heterogeneous labor markets. In their analysis of the UK economy, Corry et al. (2011)
argue that the existing centralized wage bargaining leads to excessively high public
sector wages in some areas of the country, making it difficult for the private sector
to attract skilled labor and impairing business activity. On the other hand, Propper
and van Reenen (2010) and Propper and Britton (2012) provide empirical evidence
about the negative impact on the quality of the public good in regions where the
regulated pay is lower than the market wage4. In this case it is the public authority
that struggles to attract skilled labor, and the quality of the service will be worse.
Another sort of criticism is advanced by Alesina et al. (2001). They note that paying
civil servants in poorer areas the same nominal salary of their peers in other parts
of the country can be viewed as a subsidy designed to discourage internal migration
(Caponi, 2008) or to redistribute income. More importantly, the hidden form of such
4In detail, Propper and van Reenen find out that the number of hospital deaths for emergency heart
attacks is larger in English regions where the market wage is higher than the pay received by nurses,
that is uniform across the country. Propper and Britton find that the centralized wage regulation of
teachers in England decreases educational output in regions where market wages are high.
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a transfer makes it politically attractive (Coate and Morris, 1995) and, in the case of
EU countries, points to circumvent the competition rules that forbid direct subsidies
to disadvantaged regions5.
As concerns the theoretical literature, the emphasis on the interplay between public
sector labor institutions and the private sector relates the present model to the works
of Courant et al. (1979), Holmlund (1993; 1997), Strøm (1997; 1999), and Forni and
Giordano (2003). The main difference between these papers and the present one is
the link through which the public sector affects the economy. While in my model the
change in the relative cost of the public nontradable good compared to the private
tradable one is key, these papers mainly focus on the fiscal system.
Courant et al. (1979) notice that stronger public employees market power leads to
larger government spending, but that public sector growth can be limited by the simple
optimizing behavior of civil servants, if private sector workers retain their right to mi-
grate in case of rising tax rates. If taxpayers are not mobile across communities, Strøm
(1999) shows that wage moderation is more likely to be attained under a decentralized
financing system than via a centralized one. Under the latter, public sector unions in
one local community do not take into account the consequences of a wage increase in
terms of a higher per capita tax rate and a lower availability of public services.
In a related paper, Strøm (1997) looks at the differences between a decentralized
bargaining scheme in the private sector - in which unions ignore the fact that the public
good is financed by taxes on wages - and a centralized setting. He shows the latter puts
downward pressure on wages and raises employment. Even in Holmlund (1993), the
preeminent link are the taxes levied on private sector workers to finance civil servants’
pays. Neglecting this mechanism, public sector unions ask for inefficiently higher wages
and public employment crowd out private employment6. Holmlund (1997) argues that
5 For Alesina et al. (2001), about half of the public wage bill in the South of Italy can be read as
a transfer of resources from the North.
6Empirical evidence on the crowding out impact of public employment is found by Boeri et al.
(2000), Demekas and Kontolemis (2000), Algan et al. (2002), and Afonso and Gomes (2014).
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the reservation utility of workers plays a crucial role: through that channel, an increase
in the civil servants’ pay leads to higher private sector wages, stifling labor demand
and employment. Forni and Giordano (2003) consider another link through which
public employment and wages may affect the rest of economy, namely the degree of
cooperation between public sector and private sector unions. With a high degree of
cooperation, private sectors’ unions are more willing to ask for pay rises. The reason
is that the employment losses these demands would entail in the private sector would
be partially offset by government’s creation of new public sector jobs to keep the
unemployment rate low.
Finally, this paper bears some similarities with two recent research areas. One anal-
yses cross-regional unbalances in the labour market and how they influence the impact
of a local policy or shock (see Moretti, 2011). The other strand of research studies the
interaction between imperfect labour markets and land/housing markets to address
issues like urban unemployment, ghettos, and the spatial mismatch between jobs and
ethnic minorities’s residence (see Zenou, 2009 for a thorough presentation of the main
models). Similarly to the present paper, part of this literature incorporates search
and matching frictions in a framework with geographical disparities in productivity to
study migration and unemployment7. The difference is that these models focus on the
labor market effects of changes in commuting costs and the land prices, whereas my
framework considers the variation in the cost of the public nontradable good.
3 The Basic Framework
3.1 Production and Matching Technology
Time is continuous and the model is developed in steady-state. I consider a country
composed by two regions, say a and b. Regions differ only in terms of private sector
7See Zenou (2009, chapter 3).
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productivity, while all the other product and labor market parameters are assumed to
be the same. Besides the gain in simplicity, this also allows to isolate more starkly the
effects of different public wage policies on the regional disparities that will result from
the model.
As regards the structure of the product market, I follow the standard approach of
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 4, pages 204 - 228). In each region, two interme-
diate goods and one final consumption good are produced. One intermediate good is
produced in the private sector and can be traded across the regions at a competitive
price, the other one is public and not tradable8. The consumption good is also sold
in a competitive market, but it is not tradable. Its production function takes a CES
form:
Yi =
[
Q
s−1
s
p, i + Q
s−1
s
g, i
] s
s−1
with i ∈ {a, b} and s > 0 , (1)
in which Qp, i and Qg, i respectively denote the intermediate good produced in the
private sector and the intermediate good produced in the public sector in region i.
Imposing the elasticity of substitution s greater than 0 both gross substitutability and
gross complementarity between private and public goods are allowed.
Let Pi and P (Qp, i) be the prices of the consumption good and the private interme-
diate good in region i. I consider Qp,i as the numeraire for the economy of region i.
So its price is normalized to 1 and it is equal across the regions. The final good firm in
region i minimizes its cost by taking these prices and the amount of the public good
provided by the government Qg,i as given. This leads to the following F.O.C.:
p i ·
(
Qp,i
Yi
)− 1
s
= 1 with p i ≡ PiP (Qp, i) (2)
In the entire country there is a measure normalized to L of workers that are
infinitely-lived and risk-neutral. Workers endogenously choose the region to live in,
according to a maximization rule it will be presented in the next section. Any private
8Police service, environmental protection, the administration of justice are all examples of goods
that cannot be traded.
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(resp. public) employed worker in region i produces yi (resp. 1) units of the private
(resp. public) intermediate good, with i ∈ {a, b} and ya > yb > 1:9
Qp, i = yi · Ep, i
Qg, i = Eg, i i ∈ {a, b}.
(3)
Ep, i and Eg, i respectively define the level of employment in the private sector and in
the public sector of region i.
There are frictions in the labor markets. The flow of hires in sector n ∈ {g, p} of
region i ∈ {a, b}, Mn, i, is a function of the number of vacancies, Vn, i and the number of
unemployed people living in region i and searching for a job in sector n, Un, i. There is no
on-the-job search. The matching function is written Mn, i = m (Un, i, Vn, i ). Following
most of the literature (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), I impose it is homogeneous
of degree 1 and increasing and concave in both arguments. Labor market tightness in
sector n ∈ {g, p} of region i ∈ {a, b} is denoted by θn, i ≡ Vn, i/Un, i . The rate
at which vacant jobs become filled is q(θn, i) ≡ m (Un, i, Vn, i ) /Vn, i, with q ′(θn, i) <
0. A job-seeker moves into employment at a rate f(θn, i) ≡ m (Un, i, Vn, i ) /Un, i =
θn, i q(θn, i) with f
′(θn, i) > 0.10 I also define η ≡ −q′(θn, i)θn, i/q(θn, i), the opposite of
the elasticity of the job-filling rate, and I assume to be constant11. At an exogenous
rate δg (resp. δp) a public (private) job is destroyed. Working in the public sector has
a longer duration: δp > δg.
Let Li designate the labor force in region i ∈ {a, b}, with La + Lb = L. Then one
can write Ep, i +Up, i = (1− φi)Li and Eg, i +Ug, i = φi Li, the term φi ∈ (0, 1) being
the endogenous fraction of the labor force in region i ∈ {a, b} belonging to the public
sector.
9Measuring output for public sector services is problematic. In some numerical exercises I drop
the assumption that the public sector’s productivity is lower than the private one. Results are robust
to this change. See section 8.1.
10Moreover, it is assumed that lim
θn, i→0
q(θn, i) = +∞, lim
θn, i→+∞
q(θn, i) = 0, lim
θn→0
f(θn, i) = 0 and
lim
θn→+∞
f(θn, i) = +∞.
11This is the case under the standard assumption of a Cobb-Douglas matching function.
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The equality between flows in and out each workers’ status leads to the following
equations:
Ep, i δp = [ (1− φi)Li − Ep, i ] f(θp, i)
Eg, i δg = (φiLi − Eg, i ) f(θg, i) with i ∈ {a, b}.
(4)
Rearranging, one gets the following expression for the levels of employment for each
sector in each region:
Ep,i =
f(θp, i)
δp + f(θp, i)
(1− φi)Li
Eg,i =
f(θg, i)
δg + f(θg, i)
φiLi
(5)
with i ∈ {a, b}. The employment rate for each sector in each region is defined as
en, i ≡ En, i/Li, with i ∈ {a, b} and n ∈ {p, g}. The unemployment rate in region i is
equal to:
ui =
δp
δp + f(θp, i)
(1− φi) + δg
δg + f(θg, i)
φi , with i ∈ {a, b}. (6)
Substituting equations (3) and (5) in the demand function (2), pi can be written as:
p i =
[
1 +
(
φ i
yi(1− φ i) ·
f(θg, i)
δg + f(θg, i)
· f(θp, i) + δp
f(θp, i)
) s−1
s
] 1
1−s
with i ∈ {a, b}. (7)
The price of the consumption good in region i positively depends on yi and θp, i, while
it is decreasing in φi and θg, i. As I proceed I will investigate the general implications
of this equation.
3.2 Workers’ Preferences
Let r be the discount rate common to all agents. As usual in the standard search
and matching literature (Pissarides, 2000, chapter 1), I impose the one firm - one job
assumption in the private sector.
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The expected discounted utility of the unemployed worker j searching for a job of
type n ∈ {g, p} in region i ∈ {a, b}, WUj, n, i verifies the following Bellman equation:
rWUj, n, i = zj, i + f(θn, i)
[
WEj, n, i − WUj, n, i
]
(8)
where the random term zj, i stands for the idiosyncratic preference for region i and
WEj, n, i is the discounted present value of being employed in the n sector in region
i.12 This and the following Bellman equations have a standard interpretation. Being
unemployed is like holding an asset that gives you a dividend zj, i and a capital gain,
occurring at the rate f(θn, i), equal to the term inside the square brackets. A higher
zj, i means a stronger attachment to region i for worker j.
To determine the measure of workers searching for a job in either sector and the
measure of workers choosing to live in either region, I introduce two conditions. The
first is the no arbitrage condition WUj, p, i = W
U
j, g, i = W
U
j, i, that ensures in equilibrium
there is no gain in choosing to apply for either sector. From equation (8), this implies:
f(θg, i)
[
WEj, g, i − WUj, i
]
= f(θp, i)
[
WEj, p, i − WUj, i
]
(9)
The second condition, borrowed from Moretti (2011), imposes that a generic worker
j’s relative preference for region a over region b is:
zj, a − zj, b ∼ h [−λ, λ] , (10)
12An intuitive way of deriving the Bellman equation is the following. The expected lifetime utility
of an unemployed worker WUj, n, i(t), with n ∈ {g, p} and i ∈ {a, b} takes this form:
WUj, n, i(t) =
1
1 + rdt
[
zj, idt + f(θn, i)dt ·WEj, n, i(t+ dt) + (1− f(θn, i)dt) ·WUj, n, i(t+ dt)
]
.
In words, WUj, n, i(t) is equal to the discounted sum of the flow zj, idt in the interval dt and of the
discounted expected future utilities. With probability f(θn, i)dt this utility coincides with the expected
value of being employed. With probability 1− f(θn, i)dt, it coincides with the expected value of being
unemployed. Doing some algebra and taking the limit dt→ 0, this equation coincides in steady-state
with (8). All the other Bellman equations in the model can be derived in the same way. See Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004, Appendix D) and Zenou (2009, Appendix B) for a detailed exposition.
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with h(.) being a probability density function. Parameter λ captures the importance
of the preference for location and therefore the degree of labor mobility. If λ is large,
people’s willingness to move in order to reap the benefits of higher real wages or shorter
unemployment spells is limited. Conversely, if λ is small, workers are more willing to
migrate in search of better economic conditions. With λ = 0, nobody is attached to a
region compared to the other, and there is perfect worker mobility. One can define the
value λ∗ that belongs to the marginal worker j∗, the one indifferent between searching
for a job in region a or in b:
rWUj∗, b − rWUj∗, a = 0.
If λ∗ ≡ zj∗, a − zj∗, b, from equation (8) I get:
λ∗ = f(θn, b)
[
WEj∗, n, b − WUj∗, n, b
] − f(θn, a) [WEj∗, n, a − WUj∗, n, a ] (11)
with n ∈ {g, p}. The labor forces in both regions can be written as:
Lb = H(λ
∗)L
La = (1−H(λ∗)) L ,
(12)
with H(.) being the cumulative density function. Finally, the Bellman equation for a
worker of region i ∈ {a, b} employed in sector n ∈ {g, p} is:
rWEj, n, i = zj, i +
wn, i
pi
+ δn
(
WUj, i − WEj, n, i
)
, (13)
where wn, i/pi is the real wage in sector n of region i.
3.3 Firms in the Private Sector
On the other side of the market, the Bellman equation for an active private firm is:
rJEp, i =
yi − wp, i − pk · k
pi
+ δp
(
JVp, i − JEp, i
)
, with i ∈ {a, b} (14)
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The first term in the RHS of (14) is the firm’s revenues, namely the amount of the units
of the intermediate good produced yi net of the wage bill and the rental cost of capital
equipment. I assume that each firm needs an amount k of capital, whose price pk is
determined in the international markets. The second term in the RHS is the capital
loss occurring at rate δp, with J
V
p, i being the expected value of a vacancy and defined
as follows:
rJVp, i = −
pk · k
pi
+ q(θp, i)
(
JEp, i − JVp, i
)
, with i ∈ {a, b}. (15)
The expected value of vacancy is given by the sum of the rental cost of equipment and
the capital gain that accrues from the match, multiplied by the job filling rate.
As common in search and matching models, a free-entry zero profit condition de-
termines the equilibrium values of tightness θp, i, conditional on the nominal wage and
the price level in sector i. Free-entry of vacancies and zero profits imply that JVp,i = 0.
Substituting this into (14) and (15), one gets:
yi − wp, i − pk · k
r + δp
=
pk · k
q(θp, i)
with i ∈ {a, b}. (16)
Firms’ expected discounted revenues (the LHS of (16)) are equal to the expected cost
of posting a vacancy (the RHS of (16)).
3.4 Private Sector Wage: Individual Bargaining
I assume that the wage in the private sector is negotiated between each firm and worker
at individual level. This assumption better fits the U.S. wage setting. In section 6,
I consider the case of collective negotiation between unions of firms and workers. As
we will see, this setting differs in that unions take the negative effect of the wage on
employment into account, but the main results of the paper hold true.
Assuming an axiomatic Nash solution to split the surplus WEj, p, i−WUj, i +JEp, i−JVp, i
originated from a match, the nominal wage wp, i solves the following problem:
wp, i = argmax
[
WEj, p, i − WUj, i
]β [
JEp, i − JVp, i
]1−β
, (17)
13
with i ∈ {a, b}. Parameter β denotes the exogenous bargaining power of a worker
(0 < β < 1). Knowing that JVp, i = 0, the F.O.C. of this problem is:
WEj, p, i − WUj, i = β
[
JEp, i + W
E
j, p, i − WUj, i
]
(18)
Each worker takes a share β of the total surplus. Using equations(8), (13), and (14)
one gets:
wp, i = β · [ yi + pk · k (θp, i − 1)] with i ∈ {a, b}. (19)
This wage equation is similar to the one usually obtained in search and matching
models. The nominal pay positively depends on the amount of the intermediate good
produced, yi, and labor market tightness θp, i. Substituting this expression for the
nominal wage in equation (16) yields:
ZP(θp, i) ≡ (1 − β) yi − pk · k · r + δp + (1− β)q(θi) + βf(θi)
q(θi)
= 0 , (20)
with i ∈ {a, b}. This implicit function is denoted ZP(θp, i) = 0 because of the zero-
profit condition that determines the vacancy/unemployment ratio in the private sector.
Notice that
dZP(θp, i)
d θp, i
< 0. For the limit conditions imposed on functions f(θp, i) and
q(θp, i), it is easy to see that there exists a unique θp, i that solves ZP(θp, i) = 0.
Moreover, one also get that θp, a > θp, b because ya > yb.
3.5 No arbitrage condition
Rearranging the Bellman equations (8) and (13), the no arbitrage condition (9) can be
written as:
f(θg, i)
wg, i
r + δg + f(θg, i)
= f(θp, i)
wp, i
r + δp + f(θp, i)
=
β
1− β pk · k θp, i (21)
with i ∈ {a, b}. The second equality is obtained via the free-entry condition JVp,i = 0
and equations (8), (14) and (18). So, the equation (11) defining the value of λ∗ can be
expressed as:
λ∗ =
β
1− β pk · k
(
θp,b
pb
− θp,a
pa
)
(22)
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This equation says that the tighter the private sector labor market and the lower the
cost of living in region a (resp. b), the larger the share of workers (1−H(λ∗)) L (resp.
H(λ∗)L) living there13.
4 Public Sector Bargaining
In the public sector, the nominal wage level and the amount job vacancies are deter-
mined according two mutually exclusive scenarios:
1. Regional Bargaining. The negotiation takes place at regional level by local public
authorities and unions.
2. Centralized Bargaining. The negotiation takes place at the central level by na-
tional unions and the central government.
In both cases we are in an “efficient bargaining” situation, as the parties jointly
decide the optimal level of job vacancies and wages. This arrangement better fits
the empirical evidence than a monopoly union model, that predicts a (counterfactual)
relation between wage increases and employment losses14.
13Moreover, if function h (.) were symmetric along the vertical axis, a negative (resp. positive)
value for λ∗ would imply more (resp. less) workers living in region a compared to region b
14See the seminal paper of McDonald and Solow (1981) and Gregory and Borland (1999) for an
extensive discussion. Inman (1981), Oswald et al. (1984) and Fernandez-de-Cordoba et al. (2012)
consider a similar bargaining scheme.
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4.1 Public Sector Regional Bargaining
As concerns the first scenario, the optimal values of wg,i and θg,i are obtained by solving
the following problem:
max
wg,i, θg,i
[
Eg, i
(
WEj, g, i − WUj, i
)]β
[Πi]
1−β
with Πi =
Ti
pi
− Eg, iwg, i
pi
− (Vg, i + Eg, i)pk · k
pi
and
Ti
pi
= Yi − 1
pi
·Qp, i
(23)
with i ∈ {a, b}. Unions care about the sum of the utilities of its members, that for
simplicity are all the workers in the public sector. On the other side of the bargaining,
the public authority of region i wants to maximize its revenues, namely the total amount
of taxes raised in region i, denoted by Ti, net of the wage bill and the equipment costs.
Government’s revenues are expressed in real terms, so every term in Πi is divided by the
price of the final good pi. The third equation in (23) states that the local government’s
taxes Ti are levied on the final good firms and they are equal to their profits.
15. A
corollary of the third equation in (23) is the absence of fiscal redistribution among
regions: taxes raised in one region does not finance expenses in the other one.
The utility function Πi means that the local government wants to maximize taxes
revenues over public spending. This assumption deserves some comments. There are
two main routes taken in the literature to model public employer’s decisions. One
approach considers a public authority guided only by either efficiency or equity con-
siderations (i.e. the maximization of the welfare of citizens, or the cost minimization
of the public good, or the reduction of the unemployment rate).16 The other approach
15Final good firms’ profits in real terms are equal to the amount of the consumption good produced
Yi net of the purchase of the private intermediate good, that is Qp, i multiplied by its value in terms
of the consumption good 1/pi.
16Papers along this line are Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1975), Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975)
and, more recently, Forni and Giordano (2003).
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takes another perspective by looking at the personal objectives of politicians and bu-
reaucrats: vote-maximization or some budget targets are the most studied examples
in the literature.17 In assuming that the public authority maximizes the surplus of tax
revenues over government spending, this paper follows the second approach, specifically
borrowing from the so-called “Leviathan model” introduced by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980). However, in a separate Appendix, available on request, I show that such a be-
havior delivers the same equilibrium results that would be obtained by a social planner
aiming to maximize the utility of all workers in the region, given a budget constraint.
So the choice of either approach in modeling public employer’s decisions does not affect
the main predictions of the paper.
For simplicity I assume that workers’ bargaining power β is identical across sectors
and regions. In finding the optimal values of wg, i and θg, i, both parts take the price
of the consumption good, pi as given. I discuss the implications of this assumption in
section 6.1.
The F.O.C. for wg, i that satisfies (23) is:
Eg, i
(
WEj, g, i −WUj, i
)
= β
[
Πi + Eg, i
(
WEj, g, i − WUj, i
) ]
with i ∈ {a, b} (24)
As in the private sector, workers get a fraction β of the total surplus. Before computing
the F.O.C. for θg, i, note first that the constant returns to scale property of the final
good production functions and equation (2) allow to write taxes Ti as follows:
Ti
pi
= Yi − 1
pi
Qp, i = Eg, i · (d Yi/dQg, i) with i ∈ {a, b}. (25)
Note also that in steady-state Vg,i = δg ·Eg,i/q(θg,i). Inserting this expression into Πi,
the F.O.C. for θg, i is:
β
dEg, i
d θg, i
(
WEj, g, i −WUj, i
)
Eg, i
(
WEj, g, i −WUj, i
) = −(1−β) dEg, id θg, i
[
d Yi
dQg, i
− wg, i
pi
− pk·k
pi
(
1 + δg
q(θg, i)
)]
+ Eg, i
pk·k
pi
q′(θg, i)
q2(θg, i)
δg
Πi
17For an overview of this research area, see Mueller (2003).
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with i ∈ {a, b}. Using (24), the equation above can be written in the following way:
dEg, i
d θg, i
[
d Yi
dQg, i
− wg, i
pi
− pk · k
pi
+WEj, g, i −WUj, i
]
=
δg pk · k
pi q(θg, i)
(
dEg, i
d θg, i
− Eg, i q
′(θg, i)
q(θg, i)
)
with i ∈ {a, b}. At the LHS the surplus obtained by one more public job (the term
inside the square brackets) is multiplied by the employment gain due to higher labor
market tightness, dEg, i/dθg, i. At the RHS we have the marginal cost of an increase
in tightness, namely the larger expenditures in capital equipment implied by more
vacancy creation.18 At the equilibrium, marginal cost and marginal revenues must be
equal.
Using the no arbitrage condition (21) and computing dEg, i/d θg, i via equation (5),
the F.O.C.s for wg, i and θg, i respectively become:
wg, i = pi
d Yi
dQg, i
− pk · k
(
1 +
δg
q(θg, i)
+
θp, i
f(θg, i)
)
, (26)
pi
d Yi
dQg, i
= wg, i + pk · k
[
1 +
δg
q(θg, i)
− β
1− β
θp, i
f(θg, i)
+
η
1− η
δg + f(θg, i)
q(θg, i)
]
(27)
with i ∈ {a, b}.19 Combining (26) and (27) to get rid of wg,i yields:
θg, i (δg + f(θg, i)) =
1− η
η (1− β) θp, i with i ∈ {a, b}. (28)
Since f(.) is an increasing function, this equation implies a positive relationship between
θg, i and θp, i. This stems from the no arbitrage condition. The stronger the vacancy
creation in the private sector, the shorter the unemployment spell for those searching
for a job there. So the government needs to post more vacancies (raising θg, i) to make
the value of searching for a public job equally appealing.
18Notice that the term at the RHS is equal to pk·kpi ·
d Vg, i
d θg, i
with Vg, i =
δg Eg, i
q(θg, i)
for the steady-state
equality of labor market flows.
19It is easy to see that equation (26) implies that Πi > 0, meaning that government is running
a surplus. To keep things as simple as possible, I then assume that it is distributed evenly to all
residents via a lump-sum subsidy that does not affect the agents’ behavior.
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Using equations (2), (3), and (5) to re-express the derivative d Yi/dQg, i and the
expression for the nominal wage in the first equality of (21), equation (27) can be
written as:
y
1/s
i ·
(
φi
1− φi ·
δp + f(θp, i)
f(θp, i)
· f(θg, i)
δg + f(θg, i)
)−1/s
=
= pk · k
[
1 +
δg
q(θg, i)
+
η
1− η
δg + f(θg, i)
q(θg, i)
+
β
1− β θp, i
r + δg + f(θg, i)− 1
f(θg, i)
] (29)
Definition 1 A general equilibrium of the public sector regional bargaining model
is a vector [ θp, i, θg, i, φi, wg,i, pi, Yi ] for i ∈ {a, b}, and value of λ∗ satisfying: (i) the
zero profit condition ZP(θi) = 0; (ii) the F.O.C.s for wg,i and θg, i (26) and (28); (iii)
the equation for φi, (29); (iv) the equation for λ
∗, (22); (v) the equation for Yi and the
F.O.C in the intermediate sector, (1) and (7).
The following Lemma presents the main results of the public sector regional bar-
gaining framework.
Lemma 1 If r+δg < 1, a general equilibrium of the public sector regional bargaining
model exists and it is unique. Moreover, we have:
1. θn,a > θn,b for n ∈ {p, g}.
2. pa > pb.
3. wn,a > wn,b, for n ∈ {p, g}.
4. If function h(.) is symmetric along the vertical axis, La > Lb.
The formal proof of the existence is in Appendix A. Here I focus on the properties of
the equilibrium. As regards point 1, recall that the private intermediate good sector is
more productive in region a than in region b (ya > yb). So, for the zero-profit equation
ZPi(θp, i) = 0 to hold, firms need to post more vacancies in the former than in the
latter. This implies θp, a > θp, b. In turn, we also have θg, a > θg, b, as explained when
interpreting equation (28).
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To see the inter-regional differences in the cost of living, some algebraic computa-
tions (presented in Appendix A) allow to express the price of the consumption good pi
as an increasing function of θg, i only. Since θg, a > θg, b, then pa > pb. This means that
the region with a higher productivity in the tradable good compared to nontradable
exhibits a higher cost of living. It is the well-known Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect20.
Because of labor mobility across the private tradable and the public nontradable sec-
tors, a higher marginal productivity in the former, yi, drives up the marginal value of
employment in the public sector (that is equal to 1 multiplied by the tax per unit of
public good levied on the final firm, Ti/Eg, i). A higher cost - paid via taxes - of the
public nontradable good translates into a higher price of the composite consumption
good, pi.
A greater productivity and labor market tightness in the private sector of region a
also entails a higher nominal wage: wp, a > wp, b. For the no arbitrage condition, such
a gap is present in the public sector too: wg, a > wg, b. As concerns the real wages,
results are ambiguous, for it is not possible to verify to which extent higher nominal
pays in region a are gobbled up by the more expensive cost of living. Finally, inspecting
equation (22), we have that the threshold parameter λ∗ < 0 if θp,a/pa > θp, b/pb. After
some computations (see Appendix A), one gets that this last inequality holds true.
So, if the distribution of preferences for location is symmetric, better labor market
conditions pushes the majority of workers to stay in region a.
What cannot be checked at the analytical level are the employment differences
among regions. Although region a exhibits a tighter labor market in both sectors, this
does not imply a lower unemployment rate, whose value also depends on the fraction
of workers φi searching for a public job. From equation (6), it is not possible to check
if ua < ub.
20See Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, chapter 4, for a detailed exposition.
20
4.2 Public Sector National Bargaining
In this second scenario, I assume that the nominal public sector wage (identical across
regions) is bargained over at the national level. A national union representing all the
civil servants in the economy negotiates with the central government. Labor market
tightness in the public sector of each region is also decided at national level by unions
and the central government. The Nash bargaining problem is:
max
wg , θg,a, θg, b
[
Eg, a
(
WEj, g, a − WUj, a
)
+ Eg, b
(
WEj, g, b − WUj, b
)]β
[Πa + Πb]
1−β (30)
Workers’ utilities and fall-back positions, as well as the government’s value functions,
are the same as in the section 4.1. The only difference is that in the regional case there
are two different bargaining problems, one for each region, whereas in this scenario
there is only one. The F.O.C.s for wg and θg,i (i ∈ {a, b}) are, respectively:
β
∑
i=a, b
Πi = (1− β)
∑
i=a, b
Eg, i
(
WEj, g, i −WUj, i
)
,
β
−dEg, i
d θg, i
(
WEj, g, i −WUj, i
)∑
i=a, bEg, i
(
WEj, g, i −WUj, i
) = (1− β) dEg, id θg, i
[
d Yi
dQg, i
− wg, i
pi
− pk·k
pi
(
1 + δg
q(θg, i)
)]
+ Eg, i
pk·k
pi
q′(θg, i)
q2(θg, i)
δg∑
i=a, b Πi
with i ∈ {a, b}. Using the first equation to get rid of the denominators in the second
equation, we get that the F.O.C.s for θg,a and θg, b are identical to the same conditions
(27) in the regional bargaining scenario. So, the same steps made in the previous
scenario lead to equation (29), one of the equilibrium conditions in the centralized
bargaining model21. Proceeding as in the previous section, the F.O.C on wg leads to
the following wage equation:
wg =
∑
i=a, b
Eg, i
pi
[
pi
d Yi
dQg, i
− pk · k
(
1 + δg
q(θg, i)
+
θp, i
f(θg, i)
)]
∑
i=a, b Eg, i/pi
. (31)
21It is also clear that the F.O.C.s would have been the same if I had left to local governments
and unions the choice of the amount of job vacancies, conditional on the nominal wage bargained at
national level.
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Let compare this expression with the corresponding equation (26). Under national
bargaining, the nominal public sector wage is a weighted average of the pays obtained
via regional negotiation. The endogenous weight are
Eg,i/pi∑
i=a, b Eg,i/pi
for i ∈ {a, b}. A
high value for Eg,i means that a big share of the union’s members belongs to region
i. This strengthens their implicit bargaining power and makes the nominal wage wg
closer to productivity and tightness of that region. Conversely, the price pi has a
negative impact on the implicit bargaining power of civil servants of region i. The
more expensive the cost of the consumption good in one region, the lower is the real
value of a public worker there compared to his peers in the other region.
Notice also that, unlike the regional bargaining case, this centralized scenario may
involve fiscal redistribution across regions. From equation (30), government maximizes
the total amount of taxes raised in the country, net of the sum of labor and capital
costs in both regions. So there is no constraint that prevents the public authority from
using taxes collected in one region to pay workers and capital rents in the other one.
For a better comparison between this scenario and the regional bargaining one, I
also rearrange equations (29) and (31) to get an expression without the nominal wage
wg:
φa La
pa
[
θg, a − 1− η
η (1− β)
θp, a
δg + f(θg, a)
]
+
φb Lb
pb
[
θg, b − 1− η
η (1− β)
θp, b
δg + f(θg, b)
]
= 0. (32)
While in the regional bargaining scenario both expressions in the square brackets of
(32) are equal to zero, in the national case this is not necessarily the case. In the next
section, I discuss this equation more in detail.
Since the nominal public sector wage wg is identical across regions, the no arbitrage
conditions (21) in region a and b can be rearranged to get:
θp, a
r + δg + f(θg, a)
f(θg, a)
= θp, b
r + δg + f(θg, b)
f(θg, b)
(33)
This condition creates a link between the labor markets of each region. In particular,
notice that θp, a > θp, b leads to θg, a > θg, b, for the fractions in both sides of the
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equation are increasing in θg, i (i ∈ {a, b}). This means that the central government
needs to have a tighter labor market for public jobs in the more productive region,
where stronger vacancy creation makes competition to attract workers fiercer.
The public intermediate good is financed via the same tax on the final good firm
as in the previous section. Definition 2 describes the equilibrium in this scenario.
Definition 2 A general equilibrium of the public sector national bargaining model
is a vector [ θp, i, θg, i, φi, pi, Yi ] for i ∈ {a, b}, and values of wg and λ∗ satisfying: (i)
the zero profit condition ZP(θi) = 0; (ii) the F.O.Cs for θg and wg (29) and (32); (iii)
the no arbitrage condition (33); (iv) the equation for λ∗, (11); (v) the equation for Yi
and the F.O.C in the intermediate sector, (1) and (7).
Lemma 2 presents the main features in this second scenario:
Lemma 2 If r + δg < 1, a general equilibrium of the public sector national
bargaining model exists and it is unique. Moreover, we have:
1. θn,a > θn,b for n ∈ {p, g}.
2. pa > pb.
3. wp,a > wp,b .
The formal proof is in Appendix B. Notice that the main properties of the equi-
librium (such as the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect) hold even under in the case of
centralized bargaining. The only notable difference is that under national negotiation
one cannot claim that La > Lb in case of symmetric distribution of preferences h(.).
As it will be clearer in the next section, this depends on the fact that in the central bar-
gaining scenario public employees in a (resp. b) receive a lower (resp. higher) pay than
under the regional bargaining case. This has a negative effect on migration towards
the more productive region a.
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5 Regional vs. National Public Sector Bargaining
In this section, I wonder what are the consequences on employment, prices, and real
wages of applying either regime. Let denote with superscript N the equilibrium values
in the national bargaining scenario and the superscript R the ones in the regional case.
Lemma 3 presents some intermediate outcomes, while Proposition 1 and 2 respectively
describe the welfare and the employment effects. Table 1 summarizes all the results.
Lemma 3 Compared to a regional negotiation in the public sector, the adoption of
a national bargaining delivers the following results:
1. Labor market tightness decreases in region b and increases in region a: θNg, a > θ
R
g, a
and θNg, b < θ
R
g, b.
2. The fraction of the labor force belonging to the public sector increases in region b
and decreases in region a: φNa < φ
R
a and φ
N
b > φ
R
b .
Notice first that labor market tightness in the private sectors θp, i with i ∈ {a, b}
is uniquely determined by the zero profit condition ZP(θp, i) = 0 and it is therefore
unaffected by the change in the public sector bargaining process. Point (1) of Lemma
3 is formally proved in Appendix C, but the rationale is easy to understand. Under
national bargaining, wg is a weighted average of the pays civil servant get in the regional
case, wg, a and wg, b. This means that public sector employees in the more productive
region a are paid less under central negotiation, while public employees in region b are
paid more. For the no arbitrage condition, that pushes more (resp. less) unemployed
workers of region b (resp. region a) to search for a public job, reducing (resp. increasing)
the vacancy-unemployment ratio in the public sector: θNg, a > θ
R
g, a and θ
N
g, b < θ
R
g, b. In
turn, the fraction of the labor force belonging to the public sector also increases in
region b and decreases in region a (point (2) of Lemma 3).
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Proposition 1 Compared to a regional negotiation in the public sector, the adoption
of a national bargaining delivers the following results:
1. The inter-regional differences in the cost of living increase: pNa > p
R
a and p
N
b <
pRb .
2. Real wages go up in region b and down in region a. The ratio wg, i/wp, i decreases
in region a and increases in region b.
3. All residents in region a are worse off, while residents in region b are better off.
Proposition 1 tells that a centralized public sector bargaining widens the differences
in the cost of living between regions, as the unique consumption good becomes even
more expensive in a and even cheaper in b. Computations are in Appendix C but
the intuition is the following. A centralized negotiation enhances the unitary cost of
the public good (paid via taxes Ti/Qg,i) in the richer region, whereas it lowers it in
the poorer one. In turn, a more (resp. less) expensive public good translates into a
dearer (cheaper) composite consumption good in region a (resp. b). This may appear
counter-intuitive, as it is region a (region b) that pays lower (higher) public sector
wages compared to the regional bargaining scenario. However, as an inspection of the
F.O.C. (29) makes clear, the cost of producing one unit of the public good (the RHS
of 29, equal to the tax per unit Ti/Qg,i) not only depends on the wage bill, but also on
labor market tightness θg, i. A tighter labor market means it takes more time to fill a
vacancy, raising government’ expected costs. So, the reduction in the number of public
sector job applications in region a raises the unitary cost of the public good more than
a lower wage bill reduces it22. The opposite occurs in region b. This chimes well with
the empirical evidence presented by Propper and van Reenen (2010) and Propper and
22Such a result does not depend on the assumption of efficient bargaining, but it is reinforced by
it. It can be shown that a higher θg,i reduces workers’s quasi-rents from the match W
E
j, g, i −WUj, i,
as it becomes easier to find another job in case of disagreement in the negotiation. Under efficient
bargaining this effect is taken into account, raising even more the marginal cost of θg,i.
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Britton (2012). They emphasize the recruitment problems that centralized pay systems
may have in regions where public wages are lower than private ones and the negative
consequences on public output that may entail.
The effects on real wages are obvious. From equation (19), the nominal wage wp, i
depends only on labor market tightness θp, i and it is therefore unaffected by the change
in the public sector negotiation. Given that pNa > p
R
a and p
N
b < p
R
b , private sector real
wages decrease in region a and increase in region b. Since wg, a > wg > wg, b, public
sector real wages move in the same direction not just for the change in the cost of living
but also for the variations in the nominal pays. The impact on the ratio wg, i/wp, i is
straightforward: it goes down in region a and it increases in region b. Unfortunately, it
not possible to see at the analytical level if there exists a regional wage premium (i.e.
if wg, i > wp, i with i ∈ {a, b}).23
The variations in the cost of living influence the welfare of all workers in the econ-
omy. Using equations (8), (9), (13), and (21), the expected discounted utility of the
unemployed worker j can be written as:
rWUj, i = zj, i + pk · k
β
1− β ·
θp, i
pi
with i ∈ {a, b}.
The price pi is the only variable at the LHS affected by the introduction of a national
public sector bargaining. Thus unemployed workers are better off in region b and worse
off in region a. Using (8), (9), and (21) the expected discounted utility for employed
workers can be written as:
rWEj,p,i = zj, i +
r + f(θp, i)
r + δp + f(θp, i)
wp, i
pi
,
rWEj,g,i = zj, i +
r
r + δg + f(θg, i)
wg, i
pi
+
f(θp, i)
r + δp + f(θp, i)
wp, i
pi
.
with i ∈ {a, b}. It is easy to see that private sector employees’ utility rWEj,p,a (resp.
rWEj,p,b) decreases (increases), because national bargaining raises pa (lowers pb). By the
23In the calibration, I impose a small wage premium in both regions in line with recent empirical
research. See section 7.
26
same token, the rise in labor market tightness θg, a and the real wages reduction make
civil servants in region a worse off. The opposite occurs to civil servants in region b.
Proposition 2 Compared to a regional negotiation in the public sector, the adoption
of a national bargaining delivers the following results:
1. Migration towards the more productive region decreases: LNa < L
R
a and L
N
b >
LRb .
2. The private sector employment rate increases in region a and decreases in b:
eNp, a > e
R
p, a and e
N
p, b < e
R
p, b.
3. If δ
2−η
1−η
g (1− β) η1−η > δ
1
1−η
p , the unemployment rate in region b increases.
A direct result of the change in the price levels is the decrease in migration towards
the richer region a. This can be seen analytically through equations (12) and (22). The
threshold value λ∗ that makes the marginal worker indifferent between searching for
a job in region a and b depends positively on pa and negatively on pb. Since national
bargaining makes region a relatively less affordable, more workers decide to stay in
region b.
As concerns private sector employment, the model predicts a decrease in the share
of private sector workers out the labor force ep, i ≡ Ep, i/Li in the poorer region,
where a centralized negotiation make civil service jobs more attractive (from Lemma
3, φNb > φ
R
b ). The opposite occurs in region a, in which φ
N
a < φ
R
a .
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Finally, Proposition 2 presents a sufficient condition under which a centralized pay
system in the public sector raises the unemployment rate in region b (computations
are in Appendix C). To grasp the rationale of this result, let consider the equation (6).
The unemployment rate in region b, ub, is influenced by the change in θg, b, that under
24Notice that I consider the rate and not the levels of private sector employment. Since a centralized
bargaining also lowers (raises) the labor force in region a (b), the sign of the change in the number of
private sector workers in both regions cannot be ascertained.
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a centralized pay system goes down, and φb, that goes up (Lemma 3). A lower labor
market tightness θg, b tends to raise ub, as it takes more time for a job-seeker to find
a public work in region b. On the other hand, the increase in the share of the labor
force belonging to the public sector φb has an ambiguous impact on ub. Intuitively, a
larger φb raises the unemployment rate if such a change in the composition of the labor
force adds more congestions on the public sector labor market than it reduces them in
the private sector. This is more likely to occur when, in comparison with the private
sector, there are large flows out of public sector employment (δg is relatively high, δp
is relatively low) and small flows into (f(θg, b) is relatively low, f(θp, b) relatively high).
Indeed, the sufficient condition in Proposition 2 is more likely to be fulfilled if δg is
high and δp low. Moreover, a weaker workers’ bargaining power β, by boosting private
sector vacancy creation, raises f(θp, b) and makes the public sector comparatively more
congested than the private sector.
6 Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector
Individual bargaining in the private sector is common in the U.S. labor market but quite
rare in Europe. In this section, I consider the case of collective negotiation between
unions of workers and firms and I show the results of the previous sections hold true
even under this scenario.
More precisely, I assume a “moderate” degree of geographic centralization in the
private sector pay system, namely that unions negotiate over the wage at regional level.
This implies workers’ compensation is not decided at a firm level but it is still affected
by some macro features of the area in which the firm is located. For simplicity, I
assume that workers’ (resp. employers’) union represents all the workforce (the active
firms) in the private sector of a region i ∈ {a, b}. Moreover each union behaves in
an utilitarian way, caring about the sum of the utilities of its members. The Nash
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bargaining maximization problem becomes:
wEUp, i = argmax
[
Ep, i ·
(
WEj, p, i − ·WUj, i
) ]β [
Ep, i ·
(
JEp, i − JVp, i
) ]1−β
, (34)
with i ∈ {a, b}. If the negotiation fails, all workers become unemployed while firms
need to post job vacancies again.25. The notable difference compared to the previous
setting is that unions take the negative effect of the wage on the level of employment
into account. So, the F.O.C. of equation (34) is:
β ·
Ep, i
pi
+
dEp, i
dwp, i
· (WEj, p, i − WUj, i)
Ep, i ·
(
WEj, p, i − WUj, i
) = (1− β) · Ep, ipi − dEp, idwp, i · JEp, i
Ep, i · JEp, i
,
with i ∈ {a, b}. Rearranging, one gets:
WEj, p, i −WUj, i = β
[
JEp, i + W
E
j, p, i − WUj, i
]
+ JEp, i
[
WEj, p, i − WUj, i
] · dEp, i
dwp, i
pi
Ep, i
, (35)
with i ∈ {a, b}. It is easy to see that, if dEp, i
dwp, i
= 0, the F.O.C in (35) coincides
with the individual bargaining F.O.C. in (18). Using the expression for Ep, i in (5) and
free-entry zero profit condition (16), I obtain:
dEp, i
dwp, i
= −1− η
η
· δp
δp + f(θp, i)
· Ep, i
yi − wp, i − pk · k < 0, (36)
with i ∈ {a, b}. Since unions consider the negative effect of the wage on vacancy
creation and employment, the share of the surplus going to workers is decreased by
the second term in the RHS of (35) compared to the individual bargaining setting. Of
course, firms’ part of the surplus is increased by the same extent. Using equations (8),
25Notice that the utility of the unemployed people Up, i disappears, as their situation does not change
whatever the result of the negotiation. Rosen (1997) and, more recently, Hall and Milgrom (2008)
question the hypothesis that in a collective negotiation the threat points are identical to the individual
bargaining case, pointing that a wage disagreement usually implies a delay in the production, strikes,
not massive lay-offs. In another version of the paper, I examine this approach and find no significant
difference in terms of the main results of the model.
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(13), and (14) and after some computations, one gets the expression for the wage in
the collective bargaining case:
wEUp, i = β η (yi − pk · k) ·
[δp + f(θp, i)] · [r + δp + f(θp,i)]
η [r + δp + βf(θp,i)] · [δp + f(θp, i)] + (1− η)δp
, (37)
with i ∈ {a, b}. Despite being more cumbersome, this expression exhibits the same
important features of equation(19): the nominal private sector wage is increasing with
labor market tightness θp, i and with yi. Therefore, following the same steps of section
3.4, one can obtain an implicit function determining the equilibrium value of θp, i under
the collective regional bargaining setting:
ZPEU(θp, i) ≡ yi − wEUp, i (θp, i) − pk · k −
pk · k
q(θp, i)
(r + δp) = 0 , (38)
with i ∈ {a, b}. All the other equations of the model (i.e. the F.O.C.s for θg,i and the
nominal public wage, the no arbitrage condition) remain the same. So it is straight-
forward to see that all the results of the previous section remain unchanged26.
6.1 A Remark on the Price-Taking Behavior of the Agents
In this paper unions (both in the private and in the public sector) and the government
take the price of the consumption good as given. It is natural to wonder whether
the results of the model hold true if such “big agents” internalized the effects of their
decisions on the cost of living. The question might appear particularly appropriate in
the light of a well-known literature (e.g. Calmfors and Driffil, 1988 and Alesina and
Perotti, 1997) that stresses the advantages of a national negotiation compared to a more
decentralized one in that, under the former, unions are more conscious of the impact
of their wage demands on inflation. However, this line of reasoning does not apply to
the framework considered in the present paper. Since the price of the consumption
26The only equality that does not hold under regional bargaining is the second equality in (21), as
workers’ share is no longer equal to β1−β pk ·k θp, ipi . This does not affect the results of the paper. Details
are available on request.
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good is determined at regional level, even under a regional bargaining scheme unions’
and governments’ choices could have an impact on its value. So, abandoning the price-
taking assumption does not add a further distinction between the centralized and the
regional public sector pay system, that remains the main objective of the present work.
7 Calibration
The structure of the model may offer further useful insights that unfortunately cannot
be derived at the analytical level. So I perform a numerical exercise to study the
effects on employment, real wages and inequality resulting from the adoption of either
scenario. I take the quarter as unit of time. Data refer to the period 2012 in Italy.
This country is an interesting case study. It exhibits huge economic disparities between
the North-Center regions and the South ones, the former being 50% richer in terms
of average disposable income per capita (ISTAT, 2013). Moreover, no statistically
significant difference emerges in nominal public wages paid across regions (Alesina et
al., 2001; Dell’Arringa et al., 2007). So the second scenario is the baseline model that
I will consider for the parametrization.
Results are summarized in Table 2. The discount rate is fixed at 5% on an annual
basis. Elasticity in the final good production functions s is set equal to 2.3, implying a
low level of substitution between public and private goods27. A sensitivity analysis is
performed for this and other parameters. I consider a Cobb-Douglas matching function
Mn, i = m · Uηn, i V 1−ηn, i , with i ∈ {a, b} and n ∈ {p, g}. Matching parameter η is fixed
equal to 0.5. The Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT, 2013a; 2013b) provides data
on the labor force Li, the employment levels Ei, and the unemployment rates ui in
each region28. The number of civil servants in each region, Eg,i, are obtained via the
27If it is not unrealistic to suppose a low degree of substitutability between private and public goods,
the case is even stronger for that subset of public goods that are nontradable: police services, justice
administration, etc...
28I split the Italian regions as follows. In region a I include the North (Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta,
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annual report of the Finance Ministry (MEF, 2013).29. As respects to the (quarterly)
separation rates, I set δp = 0.018 and δg = 0.015. The latter is taken from MEF
(2013). The former is taken from ISTAT (2011), the latest available source on workers’
mobility, and it is in the middle ground between the estimates of Hobijn and Sahin
(2007) (about 0.0207) and Jolivet et al. (2006) (about 0.0133). Once the numerical
values for En,i, Li, and δn (with i ∈ {a, b} and n ∈ {p, g}) are inserted in the steady
state equations (4), it is easy to see that φi and θg,i can be written as explicit functions
of the unknown variables θp,i and m, the matching coefficient.
The rest of the calibration procedure is presented in detail in Appendix D. In short,
rearranging eqs. (33), ZPa(θp,a) = 0, and (29) (evaluated both at i = a and i = b),
I obtain explicit expressions of θp,b, pk · k, ya, and yb in terms of θp,a, m, and β. As I
make clear in Appendix D, these equations need a low value for β to avoid that ya and
yb are negative. So I set β = 0.12. This number is in line with the results of Cahuc
et al. (2006), that estimate a bargaining power for workers with no managerial tasks
between 0 and 0.2.
The equilibrium values of θp,a and m are then obtained by solving a system com-
posed by equation (32) and a combination of ZPa(θp,a) = 0 and ZPb(θp,b) = 0. With
the numerical values of θp,a and m pinned down, all the other variables of the model
are then easily derived.
All the figures are presented in Table 2. Notice the tiny difference between ya
and yb, whose calibrated values are 3.35 and 3.33 respectively. As equation (46) in
Appendix D makes clear, this stems from the fact that the value for yi depends on
the levels of employment, and the entry and exit rates in region i. So Italian data on
Lombardy, Trentino, Alto Adige - South Tyrol, Veneto, Fiuli-Venezia Giulia, and Liguria) and the
Center (Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche). In region b there are Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia. I decided to exclude Lazio from the computations because
its high share of public employment is due to the presence of Rome, the capital, in its territory.
29In 2012 in Italy 11.7% of the employees in the North-Center regions were working in the publc
sector. In the South the share was 18.5%
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the labor market stocks and flows do not allow a great divergence in private sector
productivities across regions. However, this does not prevent from getting plausible
results in terms of real wage gaps, with civil servants’ real earnings in region b being
slightly lower (resp. higher) than those obtained by private sector (resp. public sector)
workers in region a and workers in the private sector in region b getting instead a much
smaller pay.
As respects to the public sector wage premium, from the calibration results I get
wg/wp,a equal to 0.92 and wg/wp,b equal to 1.7. It is difficult to compare these figures
with the empirical estimates in the literature, for the only work that looks at wage
differentials across regions is Dell’Arringa et al. (2007). They get a public sector wage
premium of 1.26 in the South and 1.12 in the North-Center, but their results are ques-
tioned for endogeneity issues by more recent research30. Despite the calibrated values
are different form those obtained by Dell’Arringa et al., they confirm the empirical
evidence that wage differentials are more favorable for civil servants in the South than
for their peers in the North.
8 Numerical Results
I compare the national bargaining scenario calibrated in the previous section with a
regional bargaining setting. Numerical results are summarized in Table 3. The first
five rows of this Table confirm the conclusions of Lemma 3 and Propositions 1 and
2. More interestingly, results on output per capita and unemployment tell that the
advantages of a regional negotiation seem greater than its costs. If nominal public
sector wages are determined at local level, public sector jobs become more attractive
in the richer region a. This lowers the recruitment costs for public employers and in
30For instance, Ghinetti (2014) finds a value of 9% at national level, not statistically significant once
selection effects in sector and education are taken into account. Other papers show a rather small
wage premium (see the overview of the literature in Ghinetti, 2014).
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turn it reduces the price of the consumption good. The opposite occurs in region b:
the cost of living in region a decreases by 2.2%, whereas in region b pb goes up by
1.1%. The change in the price of the consumption good has an obvious impact on real
earnings: pays are up to 8% higher in the richer region. In region b, the fall in real
wages is almost negligible in the private sector, but it reaches a −44% decrease in the
public sector. In accordance with Proposition 1, the adoption of a regional negotiation
pushes the public sector wage premium up in region a and down in region b. Moreover,
such changes in real terms affect migration: the labor force in region a increases by
1.6% (or, equivalently, 3.4% of the people in region b migrate in search for better job
opportunities).
As concerns the regional unemployment rates, region a experiences a modest in-
crease (from 7.6% to 7.9%) while in region b it plunges from 17.1% to 10.6%. As
explained in the comment on Proposition 2, a regional bargaining process reduces un-
employment in the poor region if the public sector labor market is highly congested, i.e.
the number of job applicants is large compared to the available job vacancies. Accord-
ing to the calibration results, this is the case for region b, as the vacancy/unemployment
ratio is 32 times lower in the public sector than in the private one (see Table 2). There-
fore, by reducing the attractiveness of a public sector occupation in b and pushing more
people to search for a job in the private sector, a regional negotiation leads to a large
decrease in the unemployment rate. In turn, such a fall in the number of jobless peo-
ple drives output per capita up, with an increase by 8% in region b compared to the
national bargaining scenario.
As respects to the aggregate variables, the second part of Table 3 shows that choos-
ing a regional bargaining scheme implies a decrease in the national unemployment rate
(from 10.6% to 8.6%). Similarly, output per capita results 2.6% higher once a regional
public sector negotiation takes place. The average real wage results 1% lower, as the
increase in compensations in the region a is outweighed by their fall in region b.
Regional bargaining also seems to have a modest but positive impact on inequality
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in the entire country: the Gini index remains substantially unchanged, but the wage
variance increase by 36%. There are two effects at work that help to understand such
results. First, a national negotiation in the public sector pushes real pays of civil
servants in the poor region to the level enjoyed by private and public sector employees
in the rich region (see Table 2). Workers in the private sector in the poor region are the
only ones with a much lower pay. Conversely, the introduction of a regional bargaining
negotiation lowers the pay of civil servants in region b by such an extent that the
cross-regional gap in real earnings gets wider. Wage variance increases.
We do not observe a similar change in the Gini index because a regional negotiation
in the public sector also decreases unemployment, so squeezing the number of the
poorest people in the economy (recall that in the model unemployed workers get no
monetary subsidy).
8.1 Robustness
I check the robustness of the results presented in section 8 by changing the value of
some crucial variables and parameters of the model. In detail, I wonder how sensible
the effects of the introduction regional bargaining negotiation are to the share of public
sector workers in each region, the degree of substitutability between private and public
goods (parameter s), and to the assumption that ya > yb > 1. Results are presented
in Table 4. There are no qualitative differences with respect to the baseline model
considered in the previous section. However, the size of the effects differs depending
on the sensitivity exercises considered.
More in detail, the first rows in Table 4 show that, as long as the private and public
goods are gross substitutes (s = 1.5 or s = 6), there are no substantial departures
from the results obtained in the baseline model with s = 2.3. Conversely, the size of
the percentage changes in the variables of interest gets much larger if the goods are
gross complements (s = 0.2). In that case, passing to a regional bargaining scheme
in the public sector makes the consumption good much cheaper in region a (−43%)
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and very expensive in region b (+22%). In turn, these huge variations in the cost of
living produce sizable effects in terms of output per capita, migration, real wage, and
inequality. Given the multiplicity of the effects at work in this model, it is difficult to
nail down a single reason for such quantitative differences. A possible explanation is
the following. Regional negotiation makes the public good in region b more expensive.
Taxes raised to finance it, as well as the price of the consumption good, go up. This
tax hike is partially offset by a decrease in the demand for the public good, that is
greater the more substitutable the goods are. So, it makes sense that under gross
complementarity region b experiences a larger increase in the cost of living31.
In another exercise, I drop the assumption of the theoretical model that public sector
is less productive than the private sector and I look at the case 1 > ya > yb. Recall
that in the calibration procedure the values for ya and yb are not arbitrarily chosen, but
they depend on the labor market flow rates and stocks of the corresponding region32.
So to look at the properties of the model when 1 > ya > yb, I have to consider an
economy with other labor market conditions, namely lower levels of employment in
both regions33. In an economy in which Ea and Eb are 1.5 lower than the calibrated
values, we have ya = 0.1 and yb = 0.09. As Table 4 illustrates, the sign of the change
in the variables of interest is the same as in the baseline model, but with a larger
magnitude. This is probably due to the fact that the elasticity of the price of the
consumption good pi with respect to θg,i is decreasing in yi. So for small values of ya
there is a greater percentage reduction in the cost of living once the increase in the
number of workers applying for public sector jobs lowers θg,a. The greater percentage
variation in pa in turn translates into percentage changes in the other variables of larger
31Of course, the same reasoning with opposite sign applies to region a.
32See equation (46) in Appendix D.
33More in detail, from equation (46) in Appendix D, we have that yi positively depends on Ep,i for
i ∈ {a, b}. So by decreasing the level of employment Ei while keeping the same fraction of public
sector jobs out of the total, I get values of yi lower than 1.
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magnitude.34
In the last two exercises, I look at the predictions of the model when the share of
civil servants in the labor force is considerably different from the calibrated version.
First, I consider an economy in which the share of public sector employees out of
total employment in the poor region is about 35% larger than the value for Southern
Italy in 2012 (i.e. 25% compared to 18.5%). As illustrated in Table 4, the qualitative
predictions of the model do not change but the size of the percentage changes is larger.
Because of decreasing returns to labor, a large number of civil servants in the poor
region lowers public sector productivity there, widening the gap with the public sector
productivity in the rich region. So the price and income effects that the introduction
of regional bargaining ensues gets larger.
In a specular exercise, I consider an economy where the shares of civil servants
do not differ much across regions. In detail, I impose the fraction of public sector
employees out of total employment in region a is 16%, 36% larger than in the baseline
model and almost equal to the same ratio in region b. Results are roughly the same of
the baseline model.
9 Conclusions
In the last two decades many European countries have experienced a transition towards
more decentralized pay systems in the private sector. For some economists this change
in the system of industrial relations is key to understanding the economic success of
some countries compared to others (e.g. see Dustmann et al., 2014 on Germany’s “mir-
acle” of the last fifteen years). Decentralization seems to combine a greater flexibility
in response to demand shocks with wage restraints to keep labor costs low.
Since such a trend has not involved the public sector, this paper tries to assess
the differences between a centralized and a decentralized wage bargaining in the civil
34The same chain of events with opposite sign occurs in region b.
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service in a country with relevant regional disparities in productivity.
The first conclusion is that neither wage-setting mechanism is a Pareto improvement
with respect to the other. Indeed, a national pay system in the public sector has
beneficial effects on residents in the poorer areas of a country and a negative impact
on the welfare of residents in the richer ones. This may help to explain the resistance
that a change towards more decentralized pay systems often stirs. It also leaves room
for interesting political economy reflections this model is not designed to deal with.
They are left for future research.
The model also predicts that national pay system impairs the creation of private
sector jobs in the poorer regions while boosting it in the richer ones. So, on the one
hand centralized wage setting can be viewed as a subsidy towards poor regions. On
the other hand, it pushes towards a greater economic diversification within the same
country, with rich regions specialized in private sector tradable activities and poor
regions more involved in the production of nontradable public goods. The long run
effects in terms of growth and human capital are difficult to ascertain, but they may
well deserve a further scrutiny.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
For the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, it is sufficient to find the values
of φi, θp, i, and θg, i (with i ∈ {a, b}) and all the remaining endogenous variables of the
model are uniquely determined. We have already seen that there is a unique θp, i that
solves ZPi(θp, i) = 0. In turn, θg, i is found via equation (28).
To determine φi, I rewrite (29) as an implicit function of θg, i and φi (i ∈ {a, b}):
G(θg, i;φi) ≡ y1/si ·
(
φi
1− φi ·
δp + f(θp, i)
f(θp, i)
· f(θg, i)
δg + f(θg, i)
)−1/s
+
− pk · k
[
1 +
δg
q(θg, i)
+
η
1− η
δg + f(θg, i)
q(θg, i)
+
β
1− β θp, i
r + δg + f(θg, i)− 1
f(θg, i)
]
= 0
Notice that ∂ Gi
∂ φi
< 0 and ∂ Gi
∂ θg, i
< 0 if r + δg < 1, for i ∈ {a, b}. For the implicit
function theorem, we have d φi
d θg, i
< 0, for i ∈ {a, b}. For the Inada conditions imposed
on the matching function, we also get that φi → 0 as θg, i → +∞, for i ∈ {a, b}. In
addition, it can be shown (details are available on request) that as φi → 1 the value
of θg, i tends to a positive finite number, denoted by θ¯
G
g, i (i ∈ {a, b}). It can also be
proved that such a value is always lower than the equilibrium value of θg, i obtained via
equation (28). So the model does not exhibit corner solutions. I conclude that there
exists a unique φi ∈ (0, 1) that solves G(θg, i;φi) = 0 for any value of θg, i > θ¯Gg, i and
i ∈ {a, b}. Figure 1 illustrates that.
Point 2 of Lemma 1 is proved as follows. I use equation (28) to express the RHS of
(29) as a function of θg, i. Then equation (7) becomes:
pi =
{
1 +
[
pk · k
(
1 +
δg
q(θg, i)
+
η
1− η (δg + f(θg, i))
1− β + β (r + δg + f(θg, i))
q(θg, i)
)]1−s} 11−s
The expression at the RHS is increasing in θg, i. Since θg, a > θg, b, then pa > pb.
As regards point 4 of Lemma 1, I show that θp,a/pa > θp, b/pb, I express pi as a
function of the RHS of (29). Then substitute θp,i via equation (28) to get:
θp, i
pi
=
{
θs−1p,i +
[
pk · k
(
1− η
η(1− β)
δg + q(θg,i)
f(θg, i)(δg + f(θg, i))
+
1− β + β(r + δg + f(θg, i))
(1− β)f(θg, i)
)]1−s} 1s−1
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This expression is increasing in θp, i and θg, i, so θp,a/pa > θp, b/pb.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
As for the regional bargaining case, to prove that a national bargaining equilibrium
exists and it is unique, it is sufficient to show that there exists a 3-tuple (θp, i; θg, i;φi)
for i ∈ {a, b} that satisfy the equations (29), (32), and (33). All the other remaining
variables of the model are easily determined once (θp, i; θg, i;φi) are found.
As concerns θp, i, I have already shown that it is uniquely determined by the implicit
equation ZP(θp, i) = 0 for i ∈ {a, b}. Moreover, from the previous Appendix we have
that there is a unique φi ∈ (0, 1) that solves G(θg, i;φi) = 0 for any value of θg, i > θ¯Gg, i
(i ∈ {a, b}). Therefore, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is proved if
there exists only one couple (θg,a > θ¯
G
g, a; θg, b > θ¯
G
g, b) solving the system composed
by equations (32) and and (33). To simplify the notation, I rewrite these equations as
implicit functions of the endogenous variables (θg, i ; φi), for i ∈ {a, b}:
Φ( θg, a; φa; θg, b; φb ) ≡
φa La
pa
[
θg, a (δg + f(θg, a))− (1− η)θp, a
η (1− β)
]
+
φb Lb
pb
[
θg, b (δg + f(θg, b))− (1− η)θp, b
η (1− β)
]
= 0.
Ω( θg, a; θg, b ) ≡ θp, a r + δg + f(θg, a)
f(θg, a)
− θp, b r + δg + f(θg, b)
f(θg, b)
= 0.
I proceed in two steps. First, I prove that Ω(θg, a; θg, b) = 0 describes an increasing
relationship in the positive hortant of the (θg, a; θg, b) space. Second, I show that, after
substituting φa and φb with the corresponding expressions via equations G(θg, a;φa) = 0
and G(θg, b;φb) = 0, the implicit function Φ(θg, a;φa; θg, b;φb) = 0 describes a decreasing
relationship in the positive hortant of the (θg, a; θg, b) space. Thus, the system admits a
unique solution in (θg, a; θg, b).
Let consider the first step. Differentiating Ω(θg, a; θg, b) = 0 yields to
∂ Ω
∂ θg, a
< 0 and
∂ Ω
∂ θg, b
> 0. For the implicit function theorem we have
d θg, b
d θg, a
> 0. Moreover, it is easy
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to see that (0; 0) is a solution of Ω(θg, a; θg, b) = 0. I conclude that Ω(θg, a; θg, b) = 0
starts from the origin and it describes a positive relationship in the space (θg, a; θg, b).
Let denote with φi = g(θg, i) the explicit function of G(θg, i;φi) = 0 for i ∈ {a, b}.
In the second step, I study the implicit equation Φ( θg, a; g(θg, a); θg, b; g(θg, b) ) = 0.
The implicit function theorem does not help in this case, for it is difficult to check
the sign of the derivatives. So I consider another approach. Let define Hi(θg,i) ≡
θg, i (δg + f(θg, i))− (1−η)θp, iη(1−β) and denote by θ¯Φg, i the solution to the equation Hi(θg,i) =
0 for i ∈ {a, b}. It easy to see that ∂ Hi
∂ θg, i
> 0, that Hi → +∞ as θg, i → +∞,
and that Hi < 0 as θg, i → 0 for i ∈ {a, b}. So θ¯Φg, i exists and it is unique (i ∈
{a, b}). It can also be proved (details are available on request) that θ¯Φg, i > θ¯Gg, i for
i ∈ {a, b}. Notice that the couple ( θ¯Φg, a; θ¯Φg, b ) is a solution of the implicit equation
Φ( θg, a; g(θg, a); θg, b; g(θg, b) ) = 0. In addition, for each θg,a ∈
(
θ¯Gg, a, θ¯
Φ
g, a
)
, we have
Ha < 0, for the function Ha is increasing and it crosses the horizontal axis at point
θ¯Φg, a. This implies that the first term at the RHS of Φ(θg, a; g(θg, a); θg, b; g(θg, b)) = 0 is
negative. For Φ(θg, a; g(θg, a); θg, b; g(θg, b)) to be equal to 0, the second term at the RHS
must be positive. This means that Hb > 0, that is the case for θg,b > θ¯Φg, b. This is
equivalent to say that Φ(θg, a; g(θg, a); θg, b; g(θg, b)) = 0 describes a negative relationship
in the space (θg, a; θg, b).
For the results in Step 1 and 2, there exists a unique positive couple (θg, a; θg, b) that
verify the equations Ω(θg, a; θg, b) = 0 and Φ(θg, a; g(θg, a); θg, b; g(θg, b)) = 0. Figure 2
illustrates that. For the properties of G( θg, i; φi ) = 0, θg,i determines the equilibrium
value of φi (i ∈ {a, b}).
The proof of point (1) of Lemma 2 follows closely the one presented in Lemma 1.
Because of higher productivity, labor market tightness in the private sector is higher
in region a. In turn, for equation (33), one also gets θg, a > θg, b.
To check that pa > pb (point 2 of Lemma 2) differentiating equation (7) yields:
d pi
d θg, i
=
∂ pi
∂ φi
· ∂φi
∂θg, i
+
∂pi
∂θg, i
,
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for i ∈ {a, b} and in which ∂φi/∂θg, i, obtained by totally differentiating equation
G( θg, i; φi ) = 0, is negative (see Appendix A). After some algebra one gets:
d pi
d θg, i
=
psi
θg,i
·
(
φ i
yi(1− φ i) ·
f(θg, i)
δg + f(θg, i)
· f(θp, i) + δp
f(θp, i)
)
· Ai > 0 (39)
with
Ai ≡ pk · k
[
η θg, i +
η2
1− η
δg + f(θg, i)
q(θg, i)
+
η δg
q(θg, i)
+
β · θp,i
1− β ·
(1− η)(1− r − δg)
f(θg, i)
]
> 0
The positive sign of such a derivative implies that pa > pb as θg, a > θg, a.
Finally, an inspection of equation (19) makes clear that wp, a > wp, b because θp, a >
θp, b and ya > yb.
Appendix C: Computations for Lemma 3 and Propo-
sitions 1 and 2
As concerns point (1) of Lemma 3, I re-write the no arbitrage condition (33) as follows:
θp, a
θg, a
r + δg + f(θg, a)
q(θg, a)
=
θp, b
θg, b
r + δg + f(θg, b)
q(θg, b)
(40)
The second factor at the LHS is greater than the second factor at the RHS, because
they are both increasing functions of θg, i (i ∈ {a, b} ) and, for Lemma 2, θg, a > θg, b.
For the equation (40) to hold, it must be that θp, a
θg, a
<
θp, b
θg, b
. This inequality and the
fact that θg, a > θg, b allow to get the sign of the terms inside the square brackets in
equation (32):
δg + f(θg, a)− (1− η)
η (1− β)
θp, a
θg, a
> 0 > δg + f(θg, b)− (1− η)
η (1− β)
θp, b
θg, b
(41)
Under the regional bargaining scenario, both expressions in (41) are equal to zero (see
equation 28). Since θp,i for i ∈ {a, b} takes the same value under both scenarios, I
conclude that the θg,a (resp. θg,b) is greater (resp. lower) under national bargaining
than under the regional case.
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Point (2) of Lemma 3 comes directly from the fact that for equation (29) φi is
a decreasing function of θg,i, for i ∈ {a, b} (see Appendix A). Thus, under national
bargaining, we jointly have a higher θg,a (resp. lower θg,b) and a lower φa (resp. higher
φb).
As concerns point (1) of Proposition 1, recall from equation (39) that pi is an
increasing function of θg,i (after taking into account that φi = g(θθg, i). This implies
that under national bargaining pa is greater and pb is lower compared to the regional
bargaining scenario.
The proof of point (3) of Proposition 3 is the following. Differentiating equation
(6), one gets:
d ub
d θg, b
=
d φb
d θg, b
[
δg
δg + f(θg, b)
− δp
δp + f(θp, b)
]
− (1− η) δg φb q(θg, b)
(δg + f(θg, b))
2 ,
in which d φb/d θg, b is obtained by totally differentiating G( θg, b; φb ) = 0 and it is
negative (see Appendix A). So d ub/d θg, b < 0 if the term inside the square brackets
is positive. In turn, this is the case if δp f(θg, b) < δg f(θp, b). With a Cobb-Douglas
matching function, we can write that
d ub
d θg, b
< 0 ←→ θp, b
θg, b
>
(
δp
δg
) 1
1−η
(42)
From (41) we know that
θp, b
θg, b
> η (1−β)
1−η (δg + f(θg, b). Using equation (42), a sufficient
condition for d ub/d θg, b < 0 is
δg
η (1− β)
1− η >
(
δp
δg
) 1
1−η
.
Rearranging, we get the same expression in point (3) of Proposition 2. Since θg, b is lower
under national bargaining than under regional bargaining, the respect of this condition
implies that the unemployment rate is higher under under national bargaining than
under regional bargaining.
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Appendix D: Calibration procedure
Rearranging the first steady-state equation in (4), I get the following expressions for
φi:
φi = 1 − Ep, i (δp + f(θp, i))
Li · f(θp, i) , (43)
for i ∈ {a, b}. Inserting this expression into the second steady state equality in 4 and
considering a Cobb-Douglas matching function, I get:
θg,i =
(
1
m
· Eg, i δg f(θp, i)
Ui · f(θp, i) − δp · Ep, i
) 1
1−η
, (44)
for i ∈ {a, b}. So φ and θg,i only depend on the unknown variables m and θp,i for
i ∈ {a, b}.
Rearranging ZPi(θp,i) = 0 for i ∈ {a, b}, I get:
pk · k = (1− β)yaq(θp,a)
r + δp + (1− β)q(θp,a) + βf(θp,a) =
(1− β)ybq(θp,b)
r + δp + (1− β)q(θp,b) + βf(θp,b) (45)
Inserting these expressions for pk · k into equation (29), I derive an explicit expression
for yi:
yi =

(
Eg,i
Ep,i
)− 1
s
[r + δp + q(θp,i)(1− β) + βf(θp,i)]
(1− β)q(θp,i)Ci + β f(θp,i)f(θg,i) [r + δg + f(θg,i)− 1]

s
s−1
(46)
with
Ci ≡ 1 + δg
q(θg, i)
+
η
1− η ·
δg + f(θg,i)
q(θg,i)
,
for i ∈ {a, b}. So yi depends on the unknown variables m, θp,i, and β. Notice that
because of the −1 term at the denominator, yi might be negative35. To avoid that, I
need to impose a low value for β, specifically 0.12.
35Recall that the calibrated values for δg and r are much smaller than 1.
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Inserting equations (43) and (44) into the no arbitrage condition (33) and doing
some algebra, I get:
1
δgEg,a
· [θp, a (rUa + δg (Ua + Eg, a)) − m−1(r + δg)δpEp, a θηp,a] =
1
δgEg,b
· [θp, b (rUb + δg (Ub + Eg, b)) − m−1(r + δg)δpEp, b θηp,b] (47)
It is easy to see that with η = 0.5, this equation can be easily rearranged as an explicit
function of θp,b in terms of m and θp,a.
So far, I used equations (4), (29), and (33) to respectively express φi, θg,i, ya, yb,
and θp,b as explicit functions of m and θp,a. Inserting these functions into equation (32)
and the second equality in (45), I get a system with two unknowns, m and θp,a. The
solutions of this system are m = 3.68 and θp,a = 0.048. Once these two variables are
pinned down, all the remaining variables are easily obtained. The threshold value λ∗ is
derived via equation (22). Finally, I get the value of λ by solving equation (12) under
the hypothesis of a uniform distribution h(.):
La = (λ − λ∗ ) L
2λ
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Analytical Results
Differences across regions
VARIABLES θp,a > θp,b θg,a > θg,b pa > pb wp,a > wp,b wg,a > wg,b La > Lb
REGIONAL yes yes yes yes yes yes∗
NATIONAL yes yes yes yes - ?
From regional to national bargaining in the public sector
VARIABLES θp,a θp,b θg,a θg,b φa φb pa pb
wn,a
pa
wn,b
pb
RESULTS = = + − − + + − − +
VARIABLES rWUj,a rW
E
j,n,a rW
U
j,b rW
E
j,nb La Lb ub ep,a ep,b
RESULTS − − + + − + +∗∗ + −
From national to regional bargaining in the public sector
VARIABLES θp,a θp,b θg,a θg,b φa φb pa pb
wn,a
pa
wn,b
pb
RESULTS = = − + + − − + + −
VARIABLES rWUj,a rW
E
j,n,a rW
U
j,b rW
E
j,nb La Lb ub ep,a ep,b
RESULTS + + − − + − −∗∗ − +
Table 1: Analytical results. Subscript n ∈ {p, g}. ∗ If function h(.) is symmetrical
along the vertical axis. ∗∗ If the condition in Proposition 2, point 3, is fulfilled.
51
Calibration
Variables Values Interpretation Source
r 0.0122 discount rate 5% on annual basis.
La, Ea 15.66, 14.4 labor force and employment in a ISTAT (2013b)
Lb, Eb 7.46, 6.18 labor force and employment in b ISTAT (2013b)
Eg,a, Eg,b 1.68, 1.13 public employment in a and b MEF (2013)
δp, 1.8% separation rate in sector p ISTAT (2010)
δg 1.5% separation rate in sector g MEF (2013)
φa, φb 0.11, 0.24 share of the labor force in g eqs. (43)
ya, yb 3.35, 3.33 private sector productivities eqs. (46)
β 0.12 workers’ bargaining power Cahuc et al. (2006)
m 3.69 matching coefficient eq. (32)
pk · k 3.30 cost of capital ZP(θp, a) = 0
θp, a 0.048 tightness in sector p, region a eq. ZP(θp, b) = 0
θp, b 0.025 tightness in sector p, region b eq. (47)
θg, a, θg, b 0.215, 0.00078 tightness in sectors g eq. (44)
wp,a/pa, wp,b/pb 0.028, 0.015 real wages in p eq. (19)
wg/pa, wg/pb 0.026, 0.027 real wages in g eq. (31)
pa, pb 0.89, 0.85 prices of the consumption good eq. (7)
λ∗ −0.011 marginal worker’s utility parameter eq. (22)
λ 0.032 preference for location Data on La and Lb
Table 2: Calibration procedure. Labor force data in millions.
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Comparison between the National and Regional Bargaining
Variables Region a Region b
Cost of living −2.2 1.1
Share of public employment 33.8 −11.8
Real wage in the private sector 2.2 −1.1
Real wage in the public sector 7.9 −44.6
Labor force 1.6 −3.4
Unemployment rate∗ 0.2 −6.5
Output per capita 0.2 8.1
Public sector wage premium 5.6 −43.9
Aggregate Variables
Unemployment rate∗ −2
Output per capita 2.6
Average real wage −1.0
Average public sector real wage −9.3
Gini index 0.1
Highest to lowest wage in the economy 8.2
Wage variance 36
Table 3: Simulation Results. Percentage changes when regional bargaining is intro-
duced in the public sector. ∗ For the unemployment rate the change is in % points.
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Robustness analysis
Regional variables
MODEL ua
∗ ub∗ pa pb Ya/La Yb/Lb La Lb
Baseline 0.2 −6.5 −2.2 1.1 0.2 8.1 1.6 −3.4
s = 1.5 0.25 −6.7 −3.5 1.8 0.5 8.1 2.6 −5.5
s = 6 0.25 −6.6 −0.8 0.4 −0.1 8.0 0.6 −1.2
s = 0.2 0.4 −6.4 −43.0 22.0 7.2 8.6 17.0 −35.7
yb < ya < 1 0.25 −6.5 −25.3 13.2 4.4 8.1 23.4 −49.2
share of civil servants in b 25% 0.2 −7.1 −4.9 2.4 1.9 8.7 4.4 −9.3
share of civil servants in a 16% 0.4 −6.5 −0.7 0.4 −0.3 8.0 0.5 −1.1
Aggregate Variables
MODEL u∗ real wage output Gini
Baseline −2.0 −1.0 2.6 0.1
s ∈ (1.5, 6) −2.0 [−2.3, 0.3] [2.4, 2.8] [−0.5, 0.5]
s = 0.2 −2.1 44.8 9.0 −15.6
yb < ya < 1 −2.3 26.4 6.8 28.7
share of civil servants in b 25% −2.2 1.2 3.8 1.2
share of civil servants in a 16% −1.9 −2.2 2.2 −0.3
Table 4: % change in the variables of interest once regional bargaining in the public
sector is introduced. Results under different scenarios. ∗ For the unemployment rate
the change is in % points.
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Figure 1: The implicit function G( θg, i; φi ) = 0 for i ∈ {a, b}
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Figure 2: Equilibrium values of θg, a and θg, b
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